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Abstract 
The retirement years can be a time of one’s life enriched by new freedom and comfort. While increased 
longevity has brought great joy into seniors’ lives, it has also brought about financial challenges for which 
many seniors and their families are unprepared. Although individuals continue to build their financial 
experience throughout their lifetime, their financial capabilities may diminish as they age. Older adults 
who experience cognitive decline often have difficulties managing their money. Financial mistakes made 
by the elderly include falling victim to financial fraud, failing to plan for future expenses, and forgetting to 
pay amounts owed. Most older individuals have exited the labor market, which limits their ability to 
respond to financial shocks. This article reviews research findings on what happens to cognition at older 
ages and how diminished financial capacity affects the financial landscape for seniors. I also outline what 
can be done to address these challenges before they become problems that can no longer be ignored. 
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Chapter 3
Challenges for Financial Decision Making
at Older Ages
Keith Jacks Gamble
Recent research studies reveal that seniors exhibit worse financial decision
making. For example, in an analysis of transaction records from a discount
brokerage, Korniotis and Kumar (2011) showed that older investors’ invest-
ment selections were less skillful. Similarly, Agarwal et al. (2009) found that
the prevalence of suboptimal credit decisions increased past age 53, and
Pottow (2012) revealed that bankruptcy filings among those age 65 and
older constituted the fastest-growing demographic group. Each of these
existing studies indirectly examined the effects of cognitive aging on finan-
cial ability by comparing across individuals of different ages. Such compari-
sons confound the effect of cognitive decline with other differences among
people of different ages. For example, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) found
the cohort effect of early-life economic conditions on risk-taking decisions
made decades later. Direct measures of cognition collected repeatedly from
the same individuals are needed to identify the effect of a decrease in
cognition on financial capabilities.
This chapter describes research results from analyses of longitudinal data
developed at the Rush University Alzheimer’s Disease Center’s Memory and
Aging Project (MAP), a large cohort study of aging (Bennett et al. 2012).
The fact that participants in the project are tested yearly provides the data
needed to identify, within individuals, the impact of decreases in cognition
on financial literacy, financial confidence, and financial decisions. Here
I focus on analyses restricted to participants in the project without dementia,
as determined by detailed clinical evaluations. These individuals may experi-
ence declines in cognitive ability considered part of normal aging and have
at most what are considered to be mild cognitive impairments. Even these
mild declines in cognitive performance reveal evidence of diminished
financial capabilities.
In what follows, I first provide an overview of research results made
possible by the Rush Memory and Aging Project. The following section
provides more detailed descriptions of the data collected and the methods
used. A final section concludes.
Overview of Research Findings
Overall my research shows that a decrease in cognition is a significant
predictor of a decrease in financial literacy among seniors. Drops in cogni-
tion are associated with decreases in each of the components of financial
literacy measured, both numeracy and financial knowledge. Moreover,
analysis finds that a decrease in cognition predicts a drop in self-confidence
in general, but importantly, it does not predict a decrease in confidence in
managing one’s own finances. Participants may not recognize or may be
reluctant to admit to this decline in their financial capability. The detrimen-
tal effects of cognitive aging on the financial choices of older people can
potentially be mitigated with help for financial decisions provided within or
outside of the household. Our analysis finds that individuals who experience
a decrease in cognition are more likely to stop managing their own finances
and pass on this responsibility to a spouse, and they are more likely to get
financial help from outside their household. Yet there are still many parti-
cipants who experience cognitive decreases who do not get help with their
financial decisions. Even among the participants experiencing statistically
significant decreases in cognition, about half get no help with their financial
decisions. While these participants are likely to benefit from trustworthy,
knowledgeable advice, knowing whom to trust regarding financial matters
can be problematic for seniors.
Trusting untrustworthy solicitors with financial matters is a growing prob-
lem, as illustrated by recent surveys. Anderson (2013) noted that fraud
complaints have increased fivefold in the past decade in the United States
according to the Federal Trade Commission; over a million complaints were
filed in 2010. The FINRA Foundation conducted a fraud survey in 2012
using a representative sample of Americans age 40+, and the results showed
that people age 65+ were targeted more often and were more likely to lose
money when targeted, compared to respondents in their 40s (FINRA
Investor Education Foundation 2013). The types of financial fraud revealed
in that study included ‘419’ frauds (Nigerian email fraud), lottery scams,
penny stock scams, boiler room calls, pyramid schemes, and free lunch
seminars that were actually sales pitches. In addition, the 2012 Senior
Financial Exploitation Study found that 56 percent of Certified Financial
Planner (CFP) professionals had an older client who had been financially
exploited, with an average estimated loss of about $50,000 per victim (CFP
Board of Standards 2012).
Little is known about why many seniors are susceptible to financial fraud
and what factors contribute to this vulnerability. One reason is a lack of data
that include the required information about fraud victimization along with
personal characteristics of victims and those not victimized. The MAP pro-
vides a notable exception: it includes yearly self-reports of fraud victimization
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along with demographic characteristics and measures of cognition, financial
literacy, and decision making. A little more than one in ten participants
reported being recently victimized by financial fraud.
We use this rich dataset to test two hypotheses concerning the causes of
fraud victimization and one concerning the consequences. We hypothesize
that decreases in cognition predict an increased likelihood of being victim-
ized by fraud. Results show that a one standard deviation decrease in
cognitive slope is estimated to increase the odds of fraud victimization by
one-third. This increase in the likelihood of fraud victimization could be
due to scammers targeting those with larger decreases in cognition more
often, and it could also be due to those people with greater decreases in
cognition becoming more vulnerable to financial scams. While we cannot
address the former explanation with our data, we can address the latter one.
For this test we use a ‘susceptibility to scam’ score, which employs a set of six
survey questions designed to capture actions and beliefs consistent with
providing an opportunity for scammers. For example, participants are
asked if they have difficulty ending a phone call and if they believe persons
over the age of 65 are often targeted by con artists. We do find that a
decrease in cognitive slope predicts a higher scam susceptibility score.
Our second fraud-related hypothesis is that over-confidence in one’s
financial knowledge is a significant predictor of the odds of becoming a
victim of financial fraud. Over-confidence is known to be a significant factor
in explaining the poor investment decision making of households. For
example, Barber and Odean (2000) showed that households lost money
by frequently trading stocks, and Barber and Odean (2001) explained this
behavior by investor over-confidence. Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) found
that investors who were over-confident diversified their investment portfolio
less, thus taking on more risk than was necessary to achieve the same level of
expected return. Our measure of over-confidence in the Rush data com-
bines participants’ answers to a set of standard financial literacy questions
with their confidence in each answer. Over-confidence is defined as getting
the literacy questions wrong while thinking that they are right. We find that
over-confidence is a significant risk factor for becoming a victim of financial
fraud. A one standard deviation increase in over-confidence increases the
odds of falling victim to fraud by 26 percent. Financial knowledge, not just
general knowledge, protects against fraud: years of education is not a
significant predictor of the likelihood of being victimized by fraud.
Our third fraud-related hypothesis concerns the impact of financial fraud
on victims’ willingness to take on financial risk. Thaler and Johnson (1990)
demonstrated that, after taking losses, many decision makers showed an
increased willingness to take on risk in an effort to break even. We also find
that financial fraud victims exhibit an increased willingness to take risk
relative to those not victimized.
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Data Description and Methods
We employ two measures of willingness to take financial risk. First, fraud
victims report an increased assessment of their lifetime willingness to take
on financial risk, relative to the decline in non-victims’ assessment of their
lifetime willingness. Second, fraud victims become increasingly willing to
accept a gamble with an equally likely chance of doubling their annual
incomes as cutting them by one-tenth. Taken at face value, this gamble is
highly attractive due to the large potential gain and limited loss. Yet, such
promises of large gains with ostensibly limited downside risk are character-
istic of sales pitches by those peddling fraudulent investments. Thus we
interpret this result that fraud victims become more attracted to such a
gamble as particularly concerning for the risk of repeated fraud victimiza-
tion. Both results regarding the increased willingness of fraud victims to take
on risk are robust to comparisons of fraud victims to otherwise similar non-
victims (see Gamble et al. 2014, 2015).
Data Collection and Construction of Measures
The dataset we use is collected by the RushMAP. Since beginning in 1997, the
survey has enrolled older participants from the Chicago metropolitan area.
Participants undergo yearly interviews and detailed clinical evaluation, includ-
ing medical history, as well as neurological and neuropsychological examin-
ations. The MAP data include demographic information for all participants
including sex and education. Participants aremostly female (only one-quarter
are male), well-educated older Americans; the average age is a little over 80
years old. The participants average three years of higher education. In 2010, a
financial decision making assessment was added to MAP.
In our analysis we exclude data from participants diagnosed with demen-
tia at the time of their financial decision making assessment. Dementia was
diagnosed in accordance with the standards set by the National Institute of
Neurologic and Communicative Disorders and Stroke and the Alzheimer’s
Disease and Related Disorders Association (Bennett et al. 2005). At the time
of these analyses, over 500 participants without dementia at the initial
decision making assessment had completed at least two decision making
assessments, needed to observe changes in decision making measures over
time. To analyze the risk factors for financial fraud victimization, we also
examined over 700 participants without dementia who had completed at
least one decision making assessment.
Yearly cognitive test scores for each participant are measured with nine-
teen tests divided into five cognitive domains: episodic memory, perceptual
speed, semantic memory, visuo-spatial ability, and working memory. Episodic
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memory captures the memory of specific events, whereas semantic memory
captures the knowledge of concepts. Working memory captures the ability to
store and process transitory information. Perceptual speed involves the ability
to process information quickly and make mental comparisons. Visuo-spatial
ability involves understanding visual representations and the spatial relation-
ships among objects. Raw scores of each of the nineteen cognitive tests are
converted to z-scores using the baseline mean and standard deviation of the
entire MAP cohort on that test. These nineteen z-scores are averaged to
compute the global cognitive function score, and the z-scores within each
domain are averaged to compute each cognitive domain score. About two-
thirds of participants experienced a decrease in their global cognition z-score
from their first decision making assessment to their most recent.
The decision making questionnaire also included eighteen standard
financial literacy questions, half to test numeracy and half to test financial
knowledge. We measure financial literacy, numeracy, and knowledge by
adding the number of correct answers in each category of questions. Parti-
cipants were made aware that they could respond that they did not know the
answer, and they could refuse to answer any question. These responses are
treated as incorrect answers in this analysis. The first two financial know-
ledge questions concerned the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and
its role in the financial system. Then participants were asked what invest-
ments mutual funds hold and how bond prices react to interest rates. The
final five financial knowledge questions were in true–false format. The first
two asked about the benefits of diversification and whether an older person
should hold riskier investments compared to a younger person. The final
three asked about paying off credit card debt, the value of frequent stock
trading, and the average historical return of stocks relative to bonds.
Each financial knowledge question also included a follow-up question
asking for the participant’s confidence in her answer to the previous know-
ledge question. Confidence may be assessed on a four-point scale from
‘extremely confident’ to ‘not at all confident’. We measure financial know-
ledge by counting the number of correct answers given to the nine financial
literacy questions. Confidence in financial knowledge is measured by sum-
ming the scores to each confidence question (extremely confident scored as
a three, fairly confident as a two, a little confident as a one, and not at all
confident as a zero). Overall participants indicate they were fairly confident
for each question. We measure over-confidence in financial knowledge by
summing the scores to the confidence questions for which the participant
got the associated financial knowledge question wrong. Thus, over-
confidence is measured as a combination of poor financial knowledge
plus a lack of awareness of poor knowledge. A participant who scored
low on financial knowledge would not be counted over-confident if she
reported being not at all confident in her answers.
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Two additional measures of confidence are also included. We assess self-
confidence using a single question that asked participants to report their
general level of confidence on a ten-point scale, with 1 indicating that they
were not at all confident, and 10 indicating that they were completely
confident. Participants displayed a high level of self-confidence, as their
self-confidence score averaged just over 7 on the ten-point scale. We assess
financial confidence with a single question that asked participants to report
to what extent they agreed with the statement: ‘I am good at managing day-
to-day financial matters such as keeping up with checking accounts, credit
cards, payments, and budgeting.’ Responses are reported on a seven-point
scale from ‘strongly agree’ indicating the highest level of financial confi-
dence (6), to ‘strongly disagree’ indicating the lowest level of financial
confidence (0). Participant confidence in managing their own finances
was similarly high on average (about five out of six), meaning that most
participants agreed with the statement that they were good at managing
their day-to-day financial matters.
Participants were also asked who was primarily responsible for making
their financial decisions. They were asked explicitly if they, their spouse,
their child, or someone else was responsible, and they were asked to specify
the relationship for a response that included someone else. Accordingly, we
can identify participants who made their own financial decisions, house-
holds who made their own financial decisions (participant or spouse),
participants that got help with financial decisions (spouse or other person
specified, possibly in addition to self), and participants that got help from
outside (someone other than the participant or spouse was included as
primarily responsible). Consistent with their high confidence in their ability
to manage finances and their high confidence in their financial knowledge,
the vast majority of participants were primarily or jointly responsible for
their financial decisions at the time of their first decision making assess-
ment. Just under one-half got help with financial decisions, including from a
spouse, child, or outside advisor. Just one-quarter got help with financial
decisions from someone other than a spouse. Over time, fewer participants
made their own financial decisions and more got help.
The decision making questionnaire included a question asking partici-
pants if, in the past year, they have been a victim of financial fraud or had
been told they were a victim of financial fraud. We use this self-report to
identify those participants who answered this question affirmatively during
any of their yearly evaluations as fraud victims. We use the data from each
participant’s first decision making questionnaire to predict which partici-
pants would report being recently victimized by financial fraud at the first or
any subsequent yearly evaluation.
The decision making questionnaire included six questions to measure
each participant’s susceptibility to scams. The first five questions asked
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participants to what extent they agreed with five statements on a seven-point
scale from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. Three statements con-
cerned the participant’s vulnerability to phone calls from a scammer. One
stated that if ‘something sounds too good to be true, then it probably is’.
Another stated that persons over the age of 65 ‘are often targeted by con-
artists’. The sixth and final item in the susceptibility to scams measure asked
whether the participant was enrolled in the national do-not-call registry. The
first five responses are each scored from one to seven, to match the strength
of the response to the question. For example, a response of ‘strongly agree’
to a statement indicating vulnerability scores a seven, while a response of
‘strongly disagree’ to the statement scores a one. Not being enrolled in the
do-not-call registry scores a seven, while being enrolled scores a one. The
susceptibility to scams measure is calculated as the sum of scores for the six
questions. The average scam susceptibility score is 21 out of a maximum 42.
We use two types of questions for assessing participant inclination to take
on financial risk. The first asked participants to report their lifetime willing-
ness to take financial risks on a ten-point scale, from not at all willing (1) to
completely willing (10). The second assessment of risk preferences asked
participants if they would be willing to take on an investment opportunity
that would double their annual income with a 50 percent probability, and
cut it by 10 percent with a 50 percent probability.
Cognitive Changes
Weuse linear regression analysis to identify the effect of a change in cognition
on several financial decision making variables. Since the focus of this
chapter is on understanding the impact of decreases in cognition on finan-
cial decision making, we also conduct robustness checks to ensure that the
results provided hold true when applied to only the subset of participants
who experienced a decrease in cognition. Changes in cognition are associ-
ated with changes in financial literacy and its components. We find that
a one-unit change in cognition is associated with a literacy score change
of about one, which comes from a 0.65 change in numeracy and a 0.44
change in financial knowledge. The size of these effects of cognitive changes
on financial literacy is modest, but it is important to consider that the
changes in cognition measured occurred over just two to three years.
Individuals experiencing cognitive decreases will also likely experience
further decreases over time. Accordingly, the impact of decreases in cogni-
tion on financial literacy is expected to accumulate with age.
We next examine how changes in global cognition are linked to a variety
of confidence measures. First, we examine the effect of a decrease in
cognition on general self-confidence, and we find that a one-unit decrease
in cognition is associated with about a one-point decrease in self-confidence.
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Yet, we find a very different result for the effect of a decrease in cognition on
one’s confidence for managing financial matters, as these are not statistic-
ally associated with changes in confidence in managing one’s finances.
Participants do not appear to recognize fully the detrimental effect of
decreased cognition on their financial ability, despite their decrease in
self-confidence in general.
We now examine to what extent those participants who experienced a
decrease in their cognitive score got help with their financial decision
making. A one-unit decrease in cognition results in triple the odds that a
participant stopped making her own financial decisions. Participants who
experienced a decrease in their cognition were more likely to obtain help
with making financial decisions. A one-unit decrease in measured cognition
resulted in more than double the odds that a participant obtained help with
her financial decisions. This result includes obtaining help from a spouse as
well as anyone outside the household. Typically, help from outside the
household was provided by a son, a daughter, or a professional financial
advisor.
Despite the strong association between decreases in cognition and seek-
ing help with financial decisions, there were still many participants who
experienced significant declines in their cognition who were not getting
help. We use each participant’s complete history of cognitive scores, includ-
ing those prior to the start of the decision making assessment, to determine
each person’s long-term cognitive trajectory. The number of annual cogni-
tion scores for participants in our sample ranged from two for the most
recent enrollees, to fifteen for long-time participants; on average partici-
pants had about seven. For each participant we determined the slope of
cognitive ability by running a simple linear regression of cognition scores on
age and a constant. There were about 150 participants who experienced
both decreased cognition during the decision making assessment and a
statistically significant cognitive decline during their entire participation in
MAP. Of these participants, only about half got help with their financial
decision making.
Financial Fraud
Next we examine whether declining cognition is predictive of fraud inci-
dence. To test this hypothesis, we use the panel of participants who began
participating in MAP prior to the decision making sub-study and subse-
quently completed at least one decision making questionnaire. For each
participant with more than one cognition score, we run a linear regression
of cognition scores on age at the time of testing, and we use the estimated
slope coefficient as our measure of cognitive slope. Data are available on
about 400 participants having an average of about six cognition scores (with
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a minimum of two and a maximum of fifteen scores). There are many
participants who have positive cognitive slopes due to the practice effect of
taking the same cognitive tests each year. Because our focus is on those
participants with decreasing cognitive ability, we conduct further analysis on
this subset of participants whom we term the cognitive slope sample.
Results weakly support our hypothesis: a one standard deviation decrease
in cognitive slope is estimated to increase odds of fraud victimization by
about one-third. The unconditional odds of recent fraud victimization in
this cognitive change sample are 11 percent; a one standard deviation
increase in over-confidence increases these odds to 15 percent. The result
is robust to including age, sex, and education in the regression as control
variables. Age is the only demographic control variable of the three found to
have a statistically significant effect. Surprisingly, the coefficient on age is
negative, indicating that older participants are less likely to report being
victimized by fraud. This is surprising since older participants have higher
scam susceptibility scores. A potential explanation for these findings is that
older participants may be less likely to admit having been a victim of fraud,
or they may be less likely to be aware of their victimization.
We also test whether steeper decreases in cognition are predictive of
higher susceptibility to scams using a regression of each participant’s scam
susceptibility score on her cognitive slope measure, again computed using
only scores prior to the first decision making questionnaire. The scam
susceptibility score used in this test is the one collected in each participant’s
first decision making questionnaire. We predict a negative coefficient on
cognitive slope, and results support this conjecture. A one standard devi-
ation decrease in cognitive slope is estimated to increase scam susceptibility
by about 21 percent of a one standard deviation change in scam susceptibility.
We also hypothesize that over-confidence regarding financial knowledge
is associated with fraud victimization. To test this, we use data on all parti-
cipants in the decision making sub-study with at least one survey conducted
when the participant was not diagnosed with dementia. There were over 700
such participants, termed the over-confidence sample. We test the hypoth-
esis using a logistic regression of fraud victimization on participant over-
confidence scores from their first decision making questionnaires. Our
results support the hypothesis: over-confidence in financial knowledge is a
significant predictor of being victimized by financial fraud, and a standard
deviation increase in over-confidence increases the estimated odds of fraud
victimization by about 26 percent. The unconditional odds of recent fraud
victimization in this subsample are 13 percent; a one standard deviation
increase in over-confidence increases these odds to 17 percent. Among the
demographic control variables, only age is statistically significant. This result
corresponds with the small, but statistically significant difference in mean
ages between fraud victims and those not victimized. Our results also show
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that the age difference does not drive the significant difference in over-
confidence between the two groups. We also test whether either of the two
components of over-confidence is, by itself, associated with fraud victimiza-
tion, but neither one is. Accordingly our prior result for over-confidence is
driven by the unique mix of its component parts.
The last fraud-related hypothesis is that being victimized by financial fraud
increases people’s propensity to take on financial risk. To calculate the before
and after change from victimization, the fraud victim must not have reported
being victimized at the time of the first decision making survey, a restriction
that excluded thirty-one fraud victims from the previous subsample. We
compare the changes for fraud victims to those of non-victims, and we
calculate changes from their first decision making survey. To test the hypoth-
esis, we compare victims’ changes and non-victims’ changes, and we also find
a fraud propensity-matched non-victim for each victim. This is how we test the
difference in changes for significance, to better isolate the impact of fraud
victimization from the selection effect of being a fraud victim.
There are fifty-nine fraud victims in this subsample, and they report a
lifetime willingness to take financial risk that increases, on average, after the
fraud. By comparison, those not victimized exhibit a slight decrease in
lifetime willingness to take on financial risk. Correspondingly, the propor-
tion of fraud victims willing to accept the 50–50 gamble with the chance to
double annual income or cut it by 10 percent increases from 12 percent
before the fraud, to 29 percent afterwards, a seventeen percentage point
increase. By contrast, the percentage of non-victims willing to accept the
gamble remained unchanged over the same period.
Because being a victim of fraud is not random, this difference includes
both the impact of fraud on risk taking, and a selection effect of the
difference in characteristics of fraud victims and those not victimized. To
better isolate the impact of fraud from the selection effect, we employ
propensity matching of fraud victims to non-victims. Fraud propensity scores
are calculated for each participant in the after fraud subsample, using the
model previously developed with over-confidence and age as statistically
significant predictors of fraud victimization. Each fraud victim was matched
to the non-victim with the closest fraud propensity score, effectively finding
the non-victim most similar in over-confidence and age. Then we compute
the propensity-match difference in financial risk-taking changes, by subtract-
ing the change of the propensity-matched non-victim from the change in
each fraud victim. The average difference of these propensity-matched
changes is statistically significant, and it implies that one impact of fraud is
to increase victims’ willingness to take on financial risk.
Further evidence of the impact of fraud on victim risk behavior is evident
in changes in victim willingness to risk some of their annual income for a
chance to double it. About 17 percent more fraud victims are willing to risk
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10 percent of their annual incomes afterwards than before being victimized.
By contrast, there is virtually no change in the willingness of non-fraud
victims to accept this 10 percent income gamble over the same period. We
again use propensity matching to better isolate the impact of fraud victim-
ization from the selection effect of being prone to fraud. The propensity-
matched difference in fraud victim and matched non-victim changes in
willingness to accept the 10 percent income gamble is 22 percent. This
result provides further evidence that the impact of fraud victimization is
an increased propensity to take on risk.
Conclusion
This chapter identifies challenges for financial decision making at older
ages using data collected by the Rush MAP. Seniors are vulnerable to
declines in cognitive ability, and diminished cognition coincides with
impaired financial decision making. Our analysis reveals that declines in
cognition are associated with decreases in financial literacy, yet many parti-
cipants do not recognize this change. Although participants experiencing
declines in their cognitive performance did show significant drops in their
general self-confidence, their confidence in their ability to manage their
finances as well as their confidence in their financial knowledge did not fall
despite drops in measured cognition. Whether help was sought or not,
participants who experienced a decrease in their cognitive score were
more likely to obtain help with their financial decisions, though perhaps
not as many received assistance as needed.
We have also identified two risk factors for senior financial fraud and one
consequence for victims’ future financial decision making. We find that
decreasing cognition is predictive of higher susceptibility to scam and future
fraud incidence. Cognitive changes may be evident to those spending time
with and caring for affected seniors, and our results show these changes
provide a warning sign for fraud vulnerability. In addition, we find that over-
confidence in financial knowledge is a significant risk factor for seniors
becoming a victim of financial fraud. Increasing the financial knowledge
of older adults is likely to help protect them from becoming financial fraud
victims. In cases where raising financial knowledge is impossible, increasing
awareness of one’s limitations may help protect against the harmful effects
of over-confidence. Finally, our analysis identifies increased willingness to
take financial risk as a consequence of fraud victimization. This increase
in risk acceptance may make victims vulnerable to subsequent exploitation.
Protecting finances from abuse should be an important part of seniors’
late life planning. Unfortunately, money is often kept out of the conversa-
tion with caregivers, as noted. One recent study found that only 2 percent of
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seniors reported being asked about their ability to manage money by their
health care providers (Investor Protection Trust 2010). While 19 percent of
adult children of senior parents who were in touch with their parent’s health
care provider had raised concerns about mental comprehension, only
5 percent had raised concerns about the handling of money.
Additional research is needed to further inform these conversations and
enhance planning. Financial victimization of seniors is a large and growing
problem, yet the availability of data to study this problem is very limited. New
data sources help us understand the factors that predict fraud victimization
and its consequences, as well as to design effective solutions to limit the
harmful consequences of cognitive decline and the impact of senior finan-
cial fraud.
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